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OPINION OF THE COURT 
____________ 
 
HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge. 
 This appeal requires us to decide whether royalties paid 
on a technology license agreement should have been treated as 
ordinary income or as capital gains. The distinction is 
significant for taxpayers like the Appellant, Dr. Spiridon 
Spireas, who earned $40 million in such royalties over just two 
tax years. If those earnings were ordinary income, Spireas 
owed a 35 percent tax; if they were capital gains he owed 15 
percent. 
 Spireas claimed the favorable capital gains treatment 
pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 1235(a), which applies to money 
received “in consideration of” “[a] transfer . . . of property 
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consisting of all substantial rights to a patent.” The 
Commissioner of Internal Revenue disagreed that Spireas was 
entitled to § 1235(a) treatment, finding that Spireas should 
have treated the royalties as ordinary income. Accordingly, the 
Commissioner gave Spireas notice of a $5.8 million deficiency 
for the 2007 and 2008 tax years. Spireas petitioned the Tax 
Court for a redetermination of the deficiency, but after a brief 
trial the Tax Court agreed with the Commissioner. Spireas 
appeals that final order.1 
I 
 Royalties paid under a license agreement are usually 
taxed as ordinary income. An exception to this general rule is 
found in section 1235 of the Internal Revenue Code, which 
affords special treatment to payments earned from certain 
technology transfers. The statute provides that “[a] transfer . . . 
of property consisting of all substantial rights to a patent . . . by 
any holder shall be considered the sale or exchange of a capital 
asset held for more than 1 year.” 26 U.S.C. § 1235(a). 
Payments made “in consideration of,” id., transfers that meet 
the statutory criteria are taxed at a long-term capital gains rate 
that can be about half of that applicable to ordinary income. 
Compare 26 U.S.C. § 1(a), (i)(2) (2008) (providing a top 
marginal rate of 35 percent for married taxpayers filing 
jointly), with 26 U.S.C. § 1(h)(1)(A)–(C) (2008) (providing a 
                                                 
1 Spireas filed the tax returns at issue jointly with his 
wife, Amalia Kassapidis-Spireas. Ms. Kassapidis-Spireas 
joined in the petition to the Tax Court and also joins this 
appeal. Since none of Ms. Kassapidis-Spireas’s conduct is 




top rate of 15 percent for most long-term capital gains).2 
Section 1235’s basic requirements are straightforward. To 
qualify for automatic capital-gains treatment, income must be 
paid in exchange for a “transfer of property” that consists of 
“all substantial rights” to a “patent.”3 Id. § 1235. As this case 
illustrates, not every transfer of “rights” will suffice because 
the statute grants capital gains treatment only to transfers of 
property. 
                                                 
2 The cited rates apply to the 2007 and 2008 tax years at 
issue here, but long-term capital gains receive similarly-
favorable treatment under current law. Compare Tax Cuts and 
Jobs Act of 2017, Pub. L. No. 115-97, § 11001(a), 131 Stat. 
2054, 2054–55 (to be codified at 26 U.S.C. § 1(j)(2)(A)) 
(providing a 37-percent top marginal rate for married taxpayers 
filing jointly), with 26 U.S.C. § 1(h)(1)(A)–(D) (providing a 
20-percent top rate for most long-term capital gains). 
3 IRS regulations provide that “[i]t is not necessary that 
the patent or patent application for the invention be in 
existence” to receive capital-gains treatment under § 1235, 26 
C.F.R. § 1.1235-2(a), and courts have long held that § 1235 is 
satisfied “so long as the invention is patentable.” See, e.g., 
Burde v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 352 F.2d 995, 998 n.4 
(2d Cir. 1965). The Tax Court found that the drug formulations 
involved in this case were patentable, Spireas v. Comm’r of 
Internal Revenue, T.C. Memo 2016-163, 2016 WL 4464695, 
at *6 n.2 (Aug. 24, 2016), and the Commissioner does not 






 Spireas is a pharmaceutical scientist who, with Dr. 
Sanford Bolton, invented “liquisolid technology.”4 That term 
describes certain drug-delivery techniques meant to facilitate 
the body’s absorption of water-insoluble molecules taken 
orally. It is not, however, a one-size-fits-all solution. Rather, 
each application of “liquisolid technology . . . is specific to a 
particular drug.” App. 50–51 (Stipulation ¶ 21). And creating 
a clinically-useful liquisolid formulation of a given drug is not 
a matter of rote recipe; it requires creating, through trial and 
error, a process specific to the substance involved. 
 The uniqueness of each liquisolid formulation meant 
that commercializing the technology was a tricky business. 
Before a drug could go to market in liquisolid form, a specific 
formulation had to “progress from . . . conception to . . . 
prototyp[ing] . . . , to extensive further development, to a form 
that c[ould] be . . . sold to the public, to actual manufacture for 
sale . . . , and, finally, to actual marketing to the public.” See 
1-6 William H. Byrnes & Marvin Petry, TAXATION OF 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND TECHNOLOGY § 6.02[1] 
(2017). Like most inventors, Spireas was unable to do all that 
alone, so in June 1998 he signed a licensing agreement with an 
established drugmaker, Mutual Pharmaceutical Co. (the 1998 
Agreement).5 The 1998 Agreement established a 
                                                 
4 Dr. Bolton is deceased, and his estate is not a party to 
this litigation. 
5 We describe the parties to the 1998 Agreement in 
simplified terms. United Research Laboratories, Inc.—a 
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comprehensive framework for licensing liquisolid technology 
to Mutual, selecting prescription drugs to develop using the 
technology, developing and selling those drugs, and paying 
Spireas royalties out of the proceeds. 
 Under the 1998 Agreement, Spireas granted Mutual two 
sets of exclusive rights: a circumscribed grant of rights to 
liquisolid technology and a much broader set of rights to 
specific drug formulations developed using that technology. 
First, the 1998 Agreement granted Mutual “[t]he exclusive 
rights to utilize the Technology,” but “only to develop 
[liquisolid drug] Products that Mutual . . . and [Spireas] . . . 
[would] unanimously select.” App. 69 (1998 Agreement 
§ 2.1.1) (emphasis added). Second, Mutual received “[t]he 
exclusive right to produce, market, sell, promote and 
distribute . . . said Products.” Id. (1998 Agreement § 2.1.2). 
 Having allocated Spireas and Mutual their respective 
rights to the liquisolid technology and liquisolid products, the 
1998 Agreement established a multistep process for producing 
marketable products and paying Spireas for his work. That 
process began when Spireas and Mutual “select[ed] a specific 
Product to develop.” App. 72 (1998 Agreement § 5.1). 
Selections had to be unanimous and made in writing. The 
                                                 
corporate affiliate of Mutual—was also a party to the 1998 
Agreement. Since none of United’s actions are relevant in this 
case, we refer only to Mutual. In addition, Spireas was joined 
on the licensor side of the equation by Dr. Bolton and Hygrosol 
Pharmaceutical Corp., which was an S corporation owned 
equally by Spireas and Bolton. Certain rights under the 1998 
Agreement were granted to Hygrosol, rather than to Spireas 
and Bolton personally. For simplicity’s sake, we refer to 
Spireas even when the 1998 Agreement refers to Hygrosol. 
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parties’ practice was to memorialize their selections in letters 
noting the “formal engagement of [Spireas] and Mutual” for a 
particular product. 1 T.C. Rec. 262–75. Once the parties were 
so engaged with respect to a particular drug, the process 
continued with the development of a practical liquisolid 
formulation, clinical testing, FDA approval, and actual 
marketing. And as sales were made and funds were received, 
Mutual would pay Spireas a 20 percent royalty on the gross 
profits it earned from liquisolid products.6  
B 
 In March 2000, Spireas and Mutual entered into an 
engagement letter (the 2000 Letter) in accordance with the 
1998 Agreement. The 2000 Letter engaged Spireas to develop, 
using liquisolid technology, a generic version of a blood-
pressure drug called felodipine.7 That development process 
succeeded after what the Tax Court found was “considerable 
                                                 
6 The 1998 Agreement also provided for Spireas to earn 
payments as compensation for certain independent consulting 
work he performed during the product selection and 
development process. The tax treatment of those payments is 
not at issue in this appeal. 
7 The 2000 Letter also engaged Spireas to develop 
liquisolid formulations for an arrhythmia drug called 
propafenone. A small portion of the royalty payments at issue 
in this appeal are attributable to propafenone sales. The Tax 
Court held that the analysis applicable to the two drugs was 
“identical in all material aspects,” and did not discuss 
propafenone separately. See Spireas, 2016 WL 4464695, at *6 




work . . . to adapt [liquisolid technology] to felodipine’s 
idiosyncrasies.” Spireas v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, T.C. 
Memo 2016-163, 2016 WL 4464695, at *6 (Aug. 24, 2016). 
Spireas completed those efforts in relatively short order. 
“When he signed the March 2000 engagement letter, [Spireas] 
had completed roughly 30% of the work that ultimately 
resulted in” the liquisolid formulation of felodipine that he 
finished inventing “sometime after May 2000.” Id. at *6, *10. 
 The FDA approved Mutual’s Abbreviated New Drug 
Application for liquisolid felodipine, and Mutual marketed it 
to great success. During the relevant time period, Spireas’s 
royalties on felodipine sales totaled just over $40 million. 
Spireas reported all of those royalties as capital gains on his 
personal returns for tax years 2007 and 2008.  
 In 2013, the Commissioner sent Spireas a notice of 
deficiency for 2007–2008. “The deficiencies arose from [the 
Commissioner’s] conclusion that the Royalties [Spireas] 
received under [the 1998 Agreement] are taxable as ordinary 
income rather than as capital gain.” Spireas, 2016 WL 
4464695, at *1. The Commissioner determined that the 
royalties under the 1998 Agreement should have been treated 
as ordinary income, and Spireas therefore owed some $5.8 
million in additional taxes.  
C 
 After receiving the Commissioner’s notice of 
deficiency, Spireas petitioned the United States Tax Court for 
a redetermination, and a brief trial was held. The main dispute 
in the Tax Court was whether Spireas had satisfied § 1235’s 
requirement that he transfer “all substantial rights to a patent.” 
Spireas, 2016 WL 4464695, at *8–9. IRS regulations define 
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“all substantial rights to a patent” to mean “all rights . . . which 
are of value at the time the rights to the patent . . . are 
transferred.” 26 C.F.R. § 1.1235-2(b)(1); see also E.I. du Pont 
de Nemours & Co. v. United States, 432 F.2d 1052, 1055 (3d 
Cir. 1970). 
 As the Tax Court put it, the parties’ differences were 
“encapsulated in the question: ‘All substantial rights to what?’” 
Spireas, 2016 WL 4464695, at *9. The Commissioner argued 
that the dispositive point was Spireas’s admitted failure to 
transfer all his rights to liquisolid technology generally. Mutual 
was not free to exploit every one of the technology’s “potential 
application to thousands of drugs,” id. at *12, and could only 
develop and sell those “Products that Mutual . . . and 
[Spireas] . . . unanimously select[ed],” App. 69 (1998 
Agreement § 2.1.1). Spireas acknowledged that he had retained 
valuable rights in the overall technology, but emphasized that 
he had transferred away all of his rights to the liquisolid 
formulation of felodipine. Spireas, 2016 WL 4464695, at *9.  
 The Tax Court agreed with the Commissioner. It held 
that Spireas could not have transferred the rights to any 
particular liquisolid products in 1998 because no products 
existed at that time. Id. Thus, the only rights Spireas could have 
granted Mutual in 1998 were in liquisolid technology 
generally—“the rights to use the liquisolid technology . . . and 
to make and sell any ‘Products containing the Technology.’” 
Id. And since Spireas had granted Mutual far less than “all 
substantial rights” to the overall liquisolid technology, the 
royalty payments he received in 2007 and 2008 did not satisfy 
the requirements of § 1235 and were thus taxable as ordinary 
income. Id. at *14. 
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 After the Tax Court entered its final order, Spireas 
timely appealed.8  
III 
A 
 Spireas’s argument on appeal is clear: his royalty 
payments qualify for capital-gains treatment under § 1235 
because he received them in exchange for “all substantial 
rights” to liquisolid felodipine. Spireas claims the 1998 
Agreement prospectively assigned Mutual the relevant rights 
long before he actually invented that particular formulation. 
The Commissioner responds that Spireas has waived any 
argument based on a prospective transfer of rights by not 
presenting it to the Tax Court. Spireas replies by declaring that 
his “position has been consistent.” Reply Br. 6.  
 Spireas’s ipse dixit is contrary to the record. In the Tax 
Court, Spireas asserted a transfer of rights that took place 
sometime “after [the felodipine formulation] was invented,” 
2 T.C. Rec. 323 (Spireas T.C. Opening Br. 12 ¶ 40), which 
happened “sometime between the end of 2000 and spring 
2001.” 2 T.C. Rec. 319 (Spireas T.C. Opening Br. 8 ¶ 23). 
Indeed, Spireas could hardly have been more explicit that he 
“did not transfer the felodipine technology in 1998.” 2 T.C. 
Rec. 322 (Spireas T.C. Opening Br. 11 ¶ 36) (emphasis added). 
In the Tax Court Spireas argued the “fundamental” view that it 
                                                 
8 The Tax Court had jurisdiction over Spireas’s petition 
under 26 U.S.C. §§ 7442 and 6214. We have jurisdiction under 
26 U.S.C. § 7482(a)(1). Venue is proper in this Court under 26 




was the post-March 2000 transfer of the felodipine formulation 
that “constituted a transfer of ‘all substantial rights’” to 
Mutual. 2 T.C. Rec. 326–27 (Spireas T.C. Opening Br. 15–16). 
 Our dissenting colleague disputes our reading of the 
record, contending that “Spireas [has] presented a complicated 
but consistent argument throughout,” and that further 
consideration of waiver is therefore “not necessary.” Dissent at 
8, 11. The dissent makes two arguments to that effect, neither 
of which we find persuasive. 
 First, the dissent emphasizes the many points of 
commonality between Spireas’s position here and in the Tax 
Court. To be sure, Spireas has consistently “relie[d] on both the 
1998 Agreement and the March 2000 Engagement letter,” and 
argued that they “operat[ed] in conjunction” to transfer to 
Mutual rights to liquisolid felodipine. Dissent at 1. And the 
dissent rightly notes that Spireas has always maintained that 
those two documents are “of a piece and related,” making up a 
“consistent course of dealing,” Dissent at 2, and that the 
ultimate terms on which Mutual obtained “rights to drug 
‘Products’ . . . depended upon the terms of the 1998 
Agreement,” Dissent at 3. 
 Notably absent, however, from that discussion of which 
instruments served to transfer rights in liquisolid felodipine is 
any mention of when Spireas claimed that transfer took place. 
The dissent appears to suggest that Spireas’s consistency on 
the former point suffices to insulate him from waiver. Dissent 
at 5 (“Spireas’s consistent emphasis on the same contractual 
provisions distinguishes his case from cases in which we have 
found waiver.”). But where waiver is concerned, the question 
is not whether a party’s position has been mostly consistent, or 
generally inclined toward the same subject as that raised on 
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appeal, but whether the same “theory” was “squarely” raised 
in the trial court. Doe v. Mercy Catholic Med. Ctr., 850 F.3d 
545, 558 (3d Cir. 2017) (citing United States v. Joseph, 730 
F.3d 336, 338–42 (3d Cir. 2013)). So even accepting at face 
value the dissent’s account of Spireas’s consistency on some 
issues, that sheds no light on whether Spireas has waived his 
new (and contradictory) argument regarding the timing of the 
transfer. 
 The dissent’s second point—that Spireas has been 
consistent in distinguishing between legal transfer of rights to 
felodipine in 1998, followed by a physical handover of 
possession in 2000—fares no better. Although that argument 
does address Spireas’s timing theory head-on, its core premise 
is belied by the record. As we have noted, Spireas’s opening 
brief to the Tax Court made his position clear: (1) “Spireas 
transferred the felodipine . . . technolog[y] . . . at some point 
after March 2000,” and (2) “Spireas’ transfer . . . constituted a 
transfer of ‘all substantial rights’ . . . to [Mutual].” 2 T.C. Rec. 
327 (Spireas T.C. Opening Br. 16) (emphasis added).  
 The dissent’s distinction between an earlier “legal 
transfer” and subsequent “physical transfer” exists only in 
what we find to be a strained reading of the single oral colloquy 
quoted in that opinion. See Dissent at 6. Spireas’s briefing 
discussed only a single “transfer” that allocated “rights” 
(whether or not it involved a physical handover as well). 2 T.C. 
Rec. 327 (Spireas T.C. Opening Br. 16). We will not read an 
isolated extemporaneous exchange to advance a theory so at 
odds with the one Spireas labeled “fundamental” in his written 




Citing our seminal precedent in United States v. Joseph, 
730 F.3d 336 (3d Cir. 2013), the Commissioner contends that 
Spireas cannot argue on appeal that he transferred rights to 
felodipine in 1998 after he took the contrary position in the Tax 
Court. See also Gen. Refractories Co. v. First State Ins. Co., 
855 F.3d 152, 162 (3d Cir. 2017) (applying Joseph to a civil 
case). Under Joseph, “merely raising an issue that 
encompasses the appellate argument is not enough.” 730 F.3d 
at 337. Whether an argument remains fair game on appeal is 
determined by the “degree of particularity” with which it was 
raised in the trial court, id. at 341, and parties must do so with 
“exacting specificity,” id. at 339. “[O]ur precedents reveal at 
least two characteristics that identical arguments always have. 
First, they depend on the same legal rule or standard. Second, 
the arguments depend on the same facts.” Id. at 342 (citation 
omitted).9 
                                                 
9 The dissent faults us for “rel[ying] on Joseph at the 
exclusion of our precedent on civil waiver.” Dissent at 14. In 
the dissent’s view Joseph is “instructive” in the civil context, 
but fails to account for “our prior precedent that civil waiver is 
a prudential doctrine to be applied in a case-specific manner.” 
Id. (emphasis added). We disagree that our application of 
Joseph in this case is inappropriate. At the outset, the dissent’s 
concession that our Court has already “appl[ied] Joseph in the 
civil context” demonstrates that our reliance is hardly novel. 
Id. Nevertheless, because those prior decisions have simply 
cited Joseph without much in the way of analysis, we think that 
a few words clarifying its role in civil cases are in order. Joseph 
arose out of Rule 12 of the Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure, which the dissent characterizes as a very “narrow 
context.” Id. We agree that Rule 12 has some unique features. 
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But the absence of those characteristics in the civil context 
clarify Joseph’s scope, not its applicability.  
Rule 12 provides in relevant part that certain “defenses, 
objections, and requests must be raised by pretrial motion” if 
possible. FED. R. CRIM. P. 12(b)(3) (emphasis added). And we 
have held that the result of failure to do so is an outright waiver 
of the argument in question. United States v. Rose, 538 F.3d 
175, 176 (3d Cir. 2008). In that respect, Rule 12 sets up a 
different scheme than prevails under Criminal Rule 52—which 
provides that arguments “not brought to the [district] court’s 
attention” are generally reviewable for plain error, FED. R. 
CRIM. P. 52(b)—and in the civil context—where courts retain 
“discretionary power to address issues that have been waived” 
under appropriate circumstances, Huber v. Taylor, 469 F.3d 
67, 74 (3d Cir. 2006). 
But while we have held that Rule 12 enacts a unique 
rule with respect to the consequences of not raising an 
argument, we have never suggested the same with respect to 
the distinct question of whether an argument was actually 
raised. Nor does anything in the text of Rule 12 itself provide 
any reason to do so. References to “raising” arguments are 
commonplace in civil cases, see, e.g., Huber, 469 F.3d at 74, 
and Joseph implicitly recognized that doctrines respecting the 
failure to raise arguments generally incorporate three distinct 
inquiries: (1) whether an argument was made, see 730 F.3d at 
338, (2) the default consequences of failing to make an 
argument (i.e. whether an argument is waived, forfeited, or 
merely subject to a less-forgiving standard of review), see id. 
at 339 n.3, and (3) the special circumstances under which those 
consequences may be excused, see id. at 338 n.2 (noting that 
waiver under Rule 12 may be excused for “good cause”); see 
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 But even under that strict standard, Spireas’s shifting 
position on the fact of when Mutual obtained its rights in 
liquisolid felodipine does not necessarily mean his entire 
argument is waived. Applying Joseph’s particularity analysis 
is not a matter of comparing every stray statement or claim 
made in the Tax Court. Rather, Joseph instructs us to compare 
arguments, a term that we have explained is synonymous with 
                                                 
also Huber, 469 F.3d at 74–75 (citations omitted) (discussing 
examples of analogous civil doctrines).  
As the dissent points out, the prudential roots of the civil 
waiver doctrine differentiate it from its criminal analogues 
with respect to the second and third questions—failure to raise 
an argument in a civil case is generally met with relatively 
softer consequences, and is more readily excused, than in a 
criminal case. Indeed, we have recognized our discretion to 
reach an argument that was not made to the district court in a 
number of circumstances, such as where it presents a purely 
legal question we think it is in the public interest to resolve. 
See, e.g., Covertech Fabricating, Inc. v. TVM Bldg. Prods., 
Inc., 855 F.3d 163, 172 n.4 (3d Cir. 2017). But Joseph 
addressed (and this appeal implicates) only the threshold 
question of whether an argument was made in the first place. 
See United States v. Washington, 869 F.3d 193, 208 n.53 (3d 
Cir. 2017) (noting that Joseph’s “specific framework . . . does 
not limit our discretion to excuse waiver or forfeiture 
concerns”). We see no basis for subjecting that inquiry to 
different standards in civil and criminal cases, and clarify today 
that Joseph provides the governing rule for both. Under that 
rule, Spireas failed to raise his prospective transfer argument 
in the Tax Court, and we decline to exercise our discretion to 
reach it on appeal. 
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“theories,” “grounds,” or “bases” for “granting relief.” 730 
F.3d at 340–42. To be sure, Joseph teaches that two arguments 
can be the same only if they “depend on the same facts,” id. at 
342, but not every fact that appears in a brief is one on which 
an argument “depends.” Whether an argument “depends” on a 
given fact requires reference to the applicable legal standard. 
As the Supreme Court has observed in another context, “the 
substantive law”—in this case, § 1235 of the Internal Revenue 
Code—“will identify which facts are material.” Anderson v. 
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). 
C 
 Under § 1235’s test for capital-gains treatment, 
changing the date on which Spireas granted Mutual rights to 
liquisolid felodipine changes the legal theory on which his 
position depends. Spireas’s royalty payments are entitled to 
capital-gains treatment only if Mutual paid them in exchange 
for a transfer of “property consisting of all substantial rights” 
to the liquisolid formulation of felodipine. 26 U.S.C. § 1235(a) 
(emphasis added). Spireas cannot make that argument for the 
first time on appeal because it depends on a different legal 
standard for when that formulation became “property” than his 
argument to the Tax Court. 
 Section 1235 is explicit that in order to secure capital-
gains treatment, an inventor must make a transfer of property 
rights that he actually possesses at the time of the grant. 
Accordingly, Spireas had to explain: (1) when he granted 
Mutual rights to liquisolid felodipine, and (2) how he obtained 
a property interest in that formulation prior to the grant. The 
account Spireas presented to the Tax Court was clear: he 
granted Mutual its rights after the invention of the liquisolid 
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formulation was complete, which happened sometime after 
March 2000. 2 T.C. Rec. 327 (Spireas T.C. Opening Br. 16).  
 That timeline included a straightforward theory of when 
and how Spireas obtained his interest in the felodipine 
formulation. To possess a transferable property interest in an 
invention, the inventor generally must have “reduced [it] to 
actual practice.” See Burde v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 
352 F.2d 995, 998 n.3 (2d Cir. 1965); see generally Byrnes & 
Petry, supra, § 6.05[3].10 That basic patent-law rule accords 
with the text of § 1235, which provides that a non-inventor 
may be a patent “holder” entitled to capital-gains treatment on 
the proceeds of a subsequent transfer only if he obtained his 
interest in exchange for consideration paid to the inventor prior 
to the invention’s “actual reduction to practice.” 26 U.S.C. 
§ 1235(b)(2). Put another way, “actual reduction to practice” is 
the line between a transfer of a then-existing “property” 
interest (which entitles the holder-transferor to immediate 
capital gains treatment) and a transfer or grant of some other 
legal interest (which makes the transferee the new “holder” 
entitled to pay the capital gains rate against the proceeds of a 
                                                 
10 While the dissent’s assertion that “transfers of future 
inventions are valid” is correct as a matter of contract law, 
Dissent at 10 (citing Byrnes & Petry, supra, § 6.05[4]), it is also 
a non sequitur. Agreements to transfer future patents are 
enforceable even if no property interest exists at the time of 
contracting. Byrnes & Petry, supra, § 6.05[3][a] (“[P]arties can 
agree in advance that upon reduction to practice the inventor 
will convey the property.”) (emphasis added), quoted by 
Dissent at 10. For tax-law purposes, the question isn’t whether 
the parties made a valid and enforceable contract, but whether 
in doing so they transferred a then-existing interest in property.  
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transfer that takes place after a subsequent reduction to 
practice). 
 “Actual reduction to practice” is a term of art in patent 
law, see generally U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, Manual 
of Patent Examining Procedure  § 2138.05(II) (9th ed. Rev. 7, 
Nov. 2015), that has a slightly looser meaning in the tax 
context. “Generally, an invention is reduced to actual practice 
when it has been tested and operated successfully under 
operating conditions.” 26 C.F.R. § 1.1235-2(e). The Tax Court 
decision from which the IRS borrowed that language clarifies 
things a bit further: “it [is] not necessary that testing . . . 
proceed[] to the point where the invention was actually ready 
to be put into commercial production . . . , but rather . . . that 
the tests should suffice to persuade . . . that the product will 
serve the purpose for which it is designed.” Comput. Sci. Corp. 
v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 63 T.C. 327, 352–53 (1974) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
 Here, the Tax Court found that Spireas’s “invention of 
the felodipine formulation occurred sometime between May 
10, 2000 . . . and May 2001.” Spireas, 2016 WL 4464695, at 
*7. Spireas does not challenge that finding on appeal. The Tax 
Court described the “invention” of the formulation rather than 
its “actual reduction to practice,” but the relevant patent law 
makes clear that if Spireas invented the formulation, he 
necessarily reduced it to practice. “Making [an] invention 
requires conception and reduction to practice.” Solvay S.A. v. 
Honeywell Int’l Inc., 742 F.3d 998, 1000 (Fed. Cir. 2014). And 
conception necessarily precedes actual reduction to practice, 
since by definition “[c]onception is [only] complete when one 
of ordinary skill in the art could construct the apparatus.” 
Sewall v. Walters, 21 F.3d 411, 415 (Fed. Cir. 1994). The 
corollary is that actual reduction to practice always completes 
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the process of “inventing.” So the Tax Court’s finding that 
Spireas “invented” the felodipine formulation after May 2000 
necessarily implies a finding that he reduced it to practice in 
the same timeframe. 
 Spireas’s original theory hinged on a post-invention 
transfer of rights. On that account Spireas reduced the 
felodipine formulation to practice around May 2000—giving 
him, in theory, the property interest that the statute requires—
and only later passed his interest on to Mutual. But Spireas has 
abandoned that theory here, insisting instead that he transferred 
rights to Mutual in 1998. See Reply Br. 6 (“What happened in 
1998 is that [Spireas] assigned Mutual his rights to future 
Products.”). Because that was at least two years before the 
invention of the felodipine formulation, Spireas’s current 
position cannot depend on the legal standard of reduction to 
actual practice to establish that he held a property right at the 
time of transfer. Nor can it depend on the same facts as did his 
argument to the Tax Court, the timing of felodipine’s invention 
central among them. Spireas’s sole claim on appeal is therefore 
waived under Joseph.11 
  
                                                 
11 Judge Shwartz would also conclude, even if the Court 
were to consider the merits of Spireas’s argument based on a 
transfer of rights in 1998, that Spireas still transferred less than 
all substantial rights in the liquisolid technology that was the 
subject of the 1998 Agreement, and thus would not be entitled 




 For the reasons stated, and because Spireas has not 
offered any reason why we should excuse his waiver, we will 
not evaluate Spireas’s new argument on appeal. The decision 
of the Tax Court will be affirmed. 
  
Spireas v. Commissioner IRS 
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ROTH, Circuit Judge, dissenting. 
 
Appellant Spiridon Spireas’s entitlement to the long-
term capital gains tax rate under I.R.C. § 1235 depends upon 
his contention that the 1998 Agreement transferred to Mutual 
all substantial rights to future drug formulations, agreed upon 
by Spireas and Mutual, including the felodipine formulation.  
Concluding that Spireas failed to advance this argument 
before the Tax Court, the Majority finds Spireas’s appeal 
barred by the waiver doctrine.  In reaching that conclusion, 
the Majority misconstrues Spireas’s arguments before the Tax 
Court and misapplies our waiver precedent.  Accordingly, I 
respectfully dissent.   
 
I.  
I turn first to the issue of consistency.  The Majority 
sees inconsistency between Spireas’s argument in the Tax 
Court and his argument on appeal.  According to the 
Majority, Spireas changed the date on which he granted 
Mutual the rights to liquisolid felodipine.  But a more careful 
examination of the record reveals that, both at trial and before 
this Court, Spireas has advanced essentially the same 
argument regarding the transfer of rights—an argument that 
relies on both the 1998 Agreement and the March 2000 
Engagement Letter, operating in conjunction to convey future 
rights to liquisolid felodipine.  On appeal, Spireas chose to 
 2 
 
“place greater emphasis” 1 on the 1998 Agreement.  The fact 
that Spireas did so in order to counter what he considered to 
be the erroneous reasoning of the Tax Court, does not provide 
a basis for the Majority to contend now that Spireas has 
changed his position.  In fact, he has merely changed the 
emphasis.  We will demonstrate that below.   
 
Spireas’s written submissions to the Tax Court 
consistently reflect his argument that the 1998 Agreement and 
the March 2000 Engagement Letter are “of a piece [and] 
related parts of the contracting parties’ consistent course of 
dealing.”2  The purpose of the 1998 Agreement was for 
Spireas to grant to Mutual a license to use the liquisolid 
technology in connection with specific products that Spireas 
and Mutual would agree to develop.3  This was accomplished 
in the 1998 Agreement.  Under it, Spireas did not transfer “all 
substantial rights” to the liquisolid technology itself but he 
did convey, as provided in ¶¶ 2.2 and 5.1, “all substantial 
rights” to the patentable formulation of the liquisolid version 
of felodipine, as provided in the March 2000 Engagement 
letter.   
 
This interpretation was corroborated at the outset of 
the litigation when Spireas and the IRS jointly addressed the 
relationship between the 1998 Agreement and the March 
2000 Engagement Letter in the First Stipulation of Facts 
(Stipulation).  The Stipulation explicitly acknowledges the 
interdependence of the 1998 Agreement and the March 2000 
                                              
1 See Gen. Refractories Co. v. First State Ins. Co., 855 F.3d 
153, 162 (3d Cir. 2017).   
2 Reply Br. at 3.   
3 App. at 8 (T.C. Op.).  
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Engagement Letter, stating, “The 1998 License Agreement 
governed the relationship and rights of the parties but, 
pursuant to ¶¶ 2.2 and 5.1 of that agreement, the parties 
entered into specific agreements each time they agreed to 
develop a new liquisolid pharmaceutical product.”4  As this 
language reflects, both Spireas and the IRS agreed that the 
1998 Agreement governed the rights of the parties, including 
the rights transferred for each product which they 
subsequently agreed to develop.  In addition, they explicitly 
acknowledged that the March 2000 Engagement Letter was 
entered into pursuant to the 1998 Agreement—specifically 
Section 2.2, which governs the conditions of Mutual’s 
“exclusive right to Produce and Sell . . . Products,”5 such as 
felodipine.   Thus, from the outset, both Spireas and the IRS 
recognized that the transfer of rights to drug “Products,” such 
as felodipine, depended upon the terms of the 1998 
Agreement.   
 
Spireas’s post-trial briefs continue to emphasize the 
importance of the 1998 Agreement and the interdependence 
between the 1998 Agreement and the March 2000 
Engagement Letter.  In his opening post-trial brief, Spireas 
described the March 2000 Engagement Letter as a “formal 
agreement . . . to identify generic felodipine as a potential 
product to develop pursuant to the 1998 License Agreement . 
. ..”6  He proceeded to explain, “The March 2000 
[Engagement Letter] applied the terms of the 1998 License 
Agreement to the felodipine product.  . . .  The parties treated 
the transfer of the felodipine technology after it was invented 
                                              
4 App. at 57.   
5 App. at 69.   
6 Appellee’s Supp. App. at 7 (emphasis added).   
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as an exclusive transfer under Section 2.1 of the 1998 License 
Agreement.”7  These statements to the Tax Court align with 
Spireas’s argument on appeal that the 1998 Agreement 
effected a legal transfer of rights to the future Products and 
that the March 2000 Engagement Letter identified the 
felodipine formulation as one of the Products to which future 
rights had been transferred.   
 
Spireas also explicitly relied on the 1998 Agreement 
when discussing the royalty payments in the Tax Court.  He 
argued throughout his opening post-trial brief that the royalty 
payments were made in exchange for rights to the felodipine 
technology and that the payments were made pursuant to 
Section 4 of the 1998 Agreement.  He argued, “The parties 
treated the transfer of the felodipine technology as subject to 
royalties under Section 4.1 of the 1998 License Agreement.”8  
Spireas reemphasized this point throughout the brief, later 
noting, “URL/Mutual paid royalties to Dr. Spireas consistent 
with Section 4.1 of the 1998 License Agreement.”9   
 
Spireas continued to emphasize the importance of the 
1998 Agreement in his answering brief.  Responding to the 
IRS’s arguments, Spireas emphasized that he “could (and did) 
transfer all of his significant rights in the felodipine . . . 
technologies to URL/Mutual under the terms of the [1998] 
Agreement.”10 Spireas also contended that the IRS 
                                              
7 Appellee’s Supp. App. at 7-8.   
8 Appellee’s Supp. App. at 9.   
9 Appellee’s Supp. App. at 13.  
10 Appellants’ Supp. App. at 27.   
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misunderstood “how the terms of the 1998 Agreement 
applied to the actual technology transfers at issue.”11   
 
As the record demonstrates, in his written submissions 
to the Tax Court, Spireas focused on many of the same 
provisions of the 1998 Agreement that he later emphasized in 
his initial brief on appeal.  Both his trial and appellate briefs 
devote particular attention to Section 2, which transfers rights 
to future Products; Section 4, which provides for a 20% 
royalty based on the sale of those Products; and Section 5, 
which sets forth the process by which future drug 
formulations will be selected as Products under the 
Agreement.  Spireas’s consistent emphasis on the same 
contractual provisions distinguishes his case from cases in 
which we have found waiver.  For instance, in Frank v. Colt 
Industries, Inc., we concluded that a finding of waiver was 
appropriate because appellant’s new theory relied upon a 
separate provision of the contract that was not at issue before 
the trial court.12  That is the opposite of the situation here.  
Spireas has relied on the same provisions of the 1998 
Agreement throughout the litigation, and he has made a 
consistent argument about the interdependence of the 1998 
Agreement and the March 2000 Engagement Letter.   
 
The Majority’s position rests upon two 
misunderstandings.  First, the Majority confuses the legal 
transfer of rights to the felodipine formulation (and other 
Products) with the physical transfer (i.e., the handover or 
disclosure) of the felodipine formulation.  Second, the 
Majority incorrectly concludes that, as a matter of law, 
                                              
11 Appellants’ Supp. App. at 28.   
12 910 F.2d 90, 99-100 (3d Cir. 1990).   
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Spireas could not have transferred rights to the liquisolid 
felodipine formulation until it was reduced to practice.   
 
The Majority’s confusion on the first point is 
understandable, since Spireas’s trial counsel did not make the 
distinction as clear as she could have.  In fact, at the close of 
trial, counsel was tripped up by this distinction herself.  
Seeking to shift the burden of proof, counsel initially asserted, 
“Dr. Spireas transferred the felodipine and propafenone 
technologies to United and Mutual at some point after that 
March 7th, 2000 agreement.”13  The Tax Court judge 
responded that the issue of transfer was not a question of fact.  
Recognizing the confusion her statement had caused, 
Spireas’s trial counsel immediately clarified, “Dr. Spireas 
gave the formulation technologies, the specific technologies, 
handed those over to [,] the felodipine and propafenone 
technologies[,] to United and Mutual at some point after 
March 7th, 2000.  So the completed formulas.”14   
 
This clarification actually underscored the distinction 
being made.  The rights to the future drug formulations were 
transferred in exchange for royalty payments.  That transfer 
of rights occurred via legal instrument—in this case, the 1998 
Agreement, which granted rights to future Products in 
exchange for 20% royalty payments, operating in conjunction 
with the March 2000 Engagement Letter, which identified the 
felodipine formulation as a Product under the 1998 
Agreement.  The actual felodipine formulation was physically 
transferred or handed over to Mutual later, at least several 
                                              
13 2 T.C. Rec. 174.   
14 2 T.C. Rec. 175 (emphasis added).   
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months after March 2000, once Spireas had completed its 
development.15   
 
Once this distinction is recognized, the purported 
inconsistency in Spireas’s argument disappears.  The 
Majority finds that Spireas “could hardly have been more 
explicit that he ‘did not transfer the felodipine technology in 
1998.”16  But the Majority mistakes this statement about the 
physical transfer of the felodipine formulation for a statement 
about the role of the 1998 Agreement in the legal transfer of 
rights to the formulation.  The transfer of legal rights—not the 
disclosure of the formulation itself—served as consideration 
for Mutual’s royalty payments.17  And the language 
immediately following Spireas’s statement in his post-trial 
brief that he “did not transfer the felodipine technology in 
1998” clarifies Spireas’s position that the rights to that 
technology were transferred via the 1998 Agreement and the 
March 2000 Engagement Letter.18  That is consistent with 
Spireas’s argument on appeal.   
 
                                              
15 See Reply Br. at 8-9.   
16 Maj. Op. at 10 (quoting 2 T.C. Rec. 322).   
17 Under any licensing agreement for a patentable product, 
payments are inherently made for the rights to make and sell 
the product, not for the product itself.  Section 1235 reflects 
this reality, as it addresses payments made in consideration 
for a transfer of “all substantial rights to a patent.” I.R.C. § 
1235 (emphasis added).   
18 2 T.C. Rec. 322 (“The March 2000 Letter Agreement 
applied the terms of the 1998 License Agreement to the 
felodipine product.”).   
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Undoubtedly, Spireas’s trial counsel could have used 
more precise language to distinguish between the legal 
transfer of rights and the physical transfer of the formulation.  
But, under this Court’s precedents, that mistake alone 
provides an insufficient basis to find that Spireas has waived 
his argument on appeal.19    Here, Spireas presented a 
complicated but consistent argument throughout his written 
submissions.  That is not the same as failing to present an 
argument entirely or presenting an argument only briefly or in 
passing.  His statements regarding the legal transfer of rights 
to the felodipine formulation via the 1998 Agreement and 
March 2000 Engagement Letter were sufficiently consistent 
to preserve his argument on appeal. 
 
Responding to these arguments, the Majority contends 
that this dissent focuses on the question of which instruments 
transferred the rights to liquisolid felodipine, at the exclusion 
                                              
19 For example, in Keenan v. City of Philadelphia, a case in 
which we stated that “the crucial question regarding waiver is 
whether [a party] presented the argument with sufficient 
specificity to alert the district court,” we nonetheless based 
our finding of waiver on the fact that the argument presented 
by the defendants on appeal appeared “[n]owhere in their 
submissions to the district court (or to this court before oral 
argument).”  983 F.2d 459, 471 (3d Cir. 1992).  In a similar 
vein, in In re Insurance Brokerage Antitrust Litigation, we 
noted that arguments “properly preserved for appeal are 
limited to those . . . presented with at least a minimum level 
of thoroughness to the District Court,” even if they were 
presented in a “conclusory fashion.”  579 F.3d 241, 262 (3d 
Cir. 2009).   
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of considering when the transfer took place.20  This is a false 
distinction.  All parties to this appeal agree that there are, at 
most, two possible “instruments of transfer”21—the 1998 
Agreement and the March 2000 Engagement Letter—and the 
Tax Court record reflects a consistent focus on these 
documents.  There were no other instruments governing the 
transfer of rights.  If, as the Majority contends, Spireas’s 
argument below depended solely upon a post-March 2000 
transfer of rights, then the extensive discussion of the 1998 
Agreement and March 2000 Engagement Letter in Spireas’s 
briefs22 and trial testimony23 would be incongruous.   
 
The Majority opinion also incorrectly concludes that 
an inventor cannot avail himself of § 1235 if he has not 
reduced an invention to practice before transferring the rights 
to that invention.24  As a result, the Majority’s approach 
forecloses reliance on the 1998 Agreement.  But the law is 
not as absolute as the Majority opinion would lead us to 
believe.  Although it may be the “general rule” that “an 
invention must have been actually reduced to practice at the 
                                              
20 Maj. Op. at 11-12.   
21 Cf. 26 C.F.R. § 1.1235-2(b).   
22 See supra notes 8-11 and accompanying text.   
23 See e.g., 2 T.C. Rec. 77 (trial testimony of Spiridon 
Spireas) (describing the March 2000 Engagement Letter as 
“the agreement . . . to transfer to Mutual those specific three 
products at the time to be worked and developed based on 
some technologies that were available at the time.”).   
24 See Maj. Op. at 16.   
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time of the sale,”25 in order for the seller to receive favorable 
tax treatment under § 1235, it is equally true that transfers of 
future inventions are valid26 and that “parties can agree in 
advance that upon reduction to practice the inventor will 
convey the property to the purchaser.”27  In these situations, a 
seller may be entitled to the benefit of § 1235, particularly 
where, as here, the future inventions are improvements on an 
existing invention.28   
 
Moreover, the Majority’s position not only precludes 
reliance on the 1998 Agreement, it would also seem to have 
us throw out the March 2000 Engagement Letter, as that 
agreement similarly predates the felodipine formulation’s 
reduction to practice.  By the Majority’s own account, the 
felodipine formulation was not reduced to practice until May 
2000 at the earliest.29  The Majority erroneously concluded 
that “Spireas’s original theory hinged on a post-invention 
transfer of rights” that occurred at some point after May 
                                              
25 William H. Byrnes & Marvin Petry, TAXATION OF 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND TECHNOLOGY § 6.05[3][b] 
(2017). 
26 Id. § 6.05[4] (citing Dreymann v. Comm’r, 11 T.C. 153 
(1948)). 
27 Id. § 6.05[3][a].  See also New Britain Mach. Co. v. Yeo, 
358 F.2d 397, 405 (6th Cir. 1966) (discussing construction of 
contracts assigning future inventions and improvements). 
28 Id. § 6.05[4].  For purposes of patent law, the liquisolid 
felodipine formulation was an “improvement” of the general 
liquisolid technique.  See 35 U.S.C. § 101.  All parties 
acknowledge that Spireas conveyed limited rights to the 
general liquisolid technique via the 1998 Agreement.   
29 Maj. Op. at 18.   
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2000.30  This conclusion reinforces the Majority’s 
misunderstanding of the distinction between the physical 
transfer of the completed formulation and the transfer of 
rights.  Moreover, it is difficult to reconcile with the extensive 
discussion of both the 1998 Agreement and the March 2000 
Engagement Letter in Spireas’s Tax Court briefs.  
 
It is clear that Spireas’s position before the Tax Court 
was consistent with his position here.  When looked at 
closely, Spireas has waived nothing because he presented the 
full facts and legal argument to the Tax Court.  The Tax Court 
erred in its interpretation of what was presented.  Spireas has 
brought the same facts and the same legal argument before us.  
In view of his consistent position, I would reverse the opinion 
of the Tax Court and remand this case with instructions to 
grant Spireas long-term capital gains treatment of the royalty 
payments in question.   
 
II. 
In light of the above, I submit that consideration of the 
issue of waiver is not necessary.  However, the Majority 
depends on waiver, and I believe it is helpful to review the 
errors of the Majority’s position on waiver.  
 
“[T]he crucial question regarding waiver is whether 
[the party] presented the argument with sufficient specificity 
to alert the [trial] court.”31  Although the case law does not 
prescribe a specific list of factors to consider in evaluating 
waiver, an assessment of waiver must be grounded in the 
                                              
30 Id.  
31 Keenan, 983 F.2d at 471. 
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prudential origins of the doctrine.  The guiding principle is 
that parties should have a chance to present all relevant 
evidence at trial and should “not be surprised on appeal by . . 
. issues upon which they have had no opportunity to introduce 
evidence.”32  The waiver doctrine is most strictly applied 
where a party’s failure to timely raise the issue below has 
resulted in an incomplete factual record on appeal.33  In 
contrast, “we are less inclined to find a waiver when the 
parties have had the opportunity to offer all the relevant 
evidence and when they are not surprised by issues on 
appeal,”34 and we are “reluctant to apply the waiver doctrine 
when only an issue of law is raised.”35   
 
Courts of appeals may exercise discretion in 
considering issues or arguments not directly raised below.36  
Ordinarily, “[f]or an issue to be preserved for appeal, a party 
‘must unequivocally put its position before the trial court at a 
point and in a manner that permits the court to consider its 
                                              
32 Hormel v. Helvering, 312 U.S. 552, 556 (1941).   
33 Shell Petroleum, Inc. v. United States, 182 F.3d 212, 219 
(3d Cir. 1999) (“‘This general rule applies with added force 
where the timely raising of the issue would have permitted 
the parties to develop a factual record,’ because we cannot 
know on appeal what evidence the adverse party would have 
presented or brought out through cross-examination.” 
(quoting Harris v. City of Phila., 35 F.3d 840, 845 (3d Cir. 
1994))).   
34 Huber v. Taylor, 469 F.3d 67, 75 (3d Cir. 2006).  
35 Id. at 74.   
36 See, e.g., Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 121 (1976); 
Bagot v. Ashcroft, 398 F.3d 252, 256 (3d Cir. 2005). 
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merits.’”37  Waiver is not an absolute bar, however, and must 
be considered on a case-by-case basis.  Even when an issue or 
argument is otherwise waived, exceptions may apply.38   
 
Our decisions in this area39 reflect the sliding scale that 
we have applied to questions of waiver.  They reinforce the 
discretion that has always been a part of our waiver analysis 
in civil cases.  Each of our waiver decisions is grounded in 
the prudential considerations underlying the doctrine:  that 
parties have an opportunity to present all relevant evidence at 
                                              
37 In re Ins. Brokerage Antitrust Litig., 579 F.3d at 262 
(quoting Shell Petroleum, Inc., 182 F.3d at 218). 
38 Hormel, 312 U.S. at 557 (“There may always be 
exceptional cases or particular circumstances which will 
prompt a reviewing or appellate court, where injustice might 
otherwise result, to consider questions of law which were 
neither pressed nor passed upon by the court or administrative 
agency below.”); Huber, 469 F.3d at 74 (“[E]ven if an issue 
was not raised, ‘[t]his Court has discretionary power to 
address issues that have been waived.’” (quoting Bagot, 398 
F.3d at 256)).   
39 See e.g., Huber 469 F.3d at 75-76 (emphasizing the 
“prophylactic and prudential origins of the [waiver] doctrine” 
and holding that a purely legal argument could and should be 
considered on appeal, even if it had been waived); In re 
Insurance Brokerage Antitrust Litig., 579 F.3d at 262 
(holding the waiver doctrine did not bar consideration on 
appeal of arguments presented to the District Court in a 
“conclusory fashion”); Frank, 910 F.2d at 99 (holding an 
argument to have been waived where its presentation on 
appeal would “raise important issues of first impression . . . as 
well as difficult questions of fact”).   
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trial and develop a complete factual record, and that the 
parties not be surprised by new issues on appeal.   
 
 The Majority, much like the Commissioner, rests its 
analysis almost entirely on United States v. Joseph,40 a case it 
characterizes as “our seminal precedent” on waiver.41  Joseph 
was a criminal case, and the question of waiver arose in the 
narrow context of a motion to suppress evidence, pursuant to 
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 12.42  As such, the 
Joseph majority expressly noted that it “d[id] not have 
occasion to consider whether the framework explained here 
applies in other waiver contexts, such as . . . waiver in civil 
cases.”43  Thus, although Joseph remains instructive, 
particularly with regard to the distinction between issues and 
arguments, it does not and cannot undermine our prior 
precedent that civil waiver is a prudential doctrine to be 
applied in a case-specific manner.  Both the majority opinion 
in Joseph itself44 and subsequent decisions applying Joseph in 
the civil context reflect this reality.45  Yet the Majority relies 
on Joseph at the exclusion of our precedent on civil waiver.   
                                              
40 730 F.3d 336 (3d Cir. 2013).   
41 Maj. Op. at 13.  
42 See Joseph, 730 F.3d at 338.   
43 Id. at 339 n.3 
44 Id. (citing Huber, 469 F.3d at 74-75).   
45 See, e.g., Gen. Refractories Co., 855 F.3d at 162 
(discussing the waiver standard in Joseph and concluding that 
“even if [Appellant’s] argument had not been placed before 
the District Court, we would nevertheless consider it in 
reaching our conclusion”).  The Majority opinion relies on In 
re J&S Properties, LLC, 872 F.3d 138, 146 (3d Cir. 2017), 
for the proposition that Joseph applies to civil cases.  J&S 
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As noted, waiver is a prudential doctrine, not an 
absolute rule.  Its purpose is to provide parties “an 
opportunity to offer all evidence they believe relevant to the 
issues” and ensure “that litigants may not be surprised on 
appeal by final decision there of issues upon which they have 
had no opportunity to introduce evidence.”46  These 
justifications inform our approach to the waiver doctrine and 
explain the flexible approach we have taken across various 
decisions.47  In cases that do not present the particular 
problems the waiver doctrine protects against, we are less 
likely find that an issue has been waived.48  This is such a 
case.   
 
The evidentiary record in this case is fully developed.  
The relevant documents—primarily the 1998 Agreement and 
the March 2000 Engagement Letter—have been available to 
all parties from the outset of this litigation.  On appeal, 
neither Spireas, nor the IRS in response, rely on any evidence 
not presented to the Tax Court.  The substantive question of 
whether the 1998 Agreement effected a transfer of future 
rights to Products can be resolved fully based on the current 
record.   
                                                                                                     
Properties includes only a brief discussion of waiver and a 
single citation to Joseph, with no substantive analysis of the 
case or its applicability in the civil context.  Other recent 
cases, such as General Refractories, make clear that Joseph 
may be instructive in the civil context but does not alter the 
prudential and fact-specific nature of the civil waiver 
doctrine.    
46 Hormel, 312 U.S. at 556.   
47 See Huber, 469 F.3d at 74-75.   
48 Id. at 75.   
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In addition, the IRS cannot credibly claim to be 
“surprised” by any of the issues presented on appeal.  As 
Section I demonstrates, Spireas’s position regarding the 1998 
Agreement was apparent throughout his written submissions 
to the Tax Court.  Furthermore, the Tax Court actually 
decided the question of what agreement served as the 
instrument of transfer.49  The Tax Court’s ruling certainly 
gave the IRS sufficient notice that the issue might be raised 
on appeal.   
 
This case presents none of the core problems that the 
waiver doctrine is designed to protect against.  The relevant 
issues can be decided based on the available record without 
prejudice to either party.  Thus, Spireas has preserved his 
current argument, and the circumstances of this case weigh 
against applying the waiver doctrine strictly and in favor of 
deciding this appeal on the merits.   
 
III. 
                                              
49 See App. at 25-34 (T.C. Op.).  The Tax Court, 
unfortunately, misstated Spireas’s position on this issue by 
relying almost exclusively on the testimony of George Gould.  
See Id. at 29-30 & n.6 (treating Gould’s testimony as 
Spireas’s position regarding the 1998 Agreement and March 
2000 Engagement Letter).  Spireas’s post-trial briefs, 
however, include no mention of the alternative theory Gould 
concocted at trial and cite almost exclusively to Gould’s 
expert report rather than his trial testimony.  See 2 T.C. 307-
44 (Spireas’s Post-trial Opening Brief); 2 T.C. 366-422 
(Spireas’s Post-trial Answering Brief).   
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For the above reasons, I conclude that the Majority has 
misinterpreted the facts of record and has erred in concluding 
that Spireas waived his argument on appeal.  I therefore 
respectfully dissent.  The Majority, having found Spireas’s 
argument waived, does not reach the merits of this appeal.  
Were we to reach the merits, I would conclude that Spireas is 
entitled to long-term capital gains rate under I.R.C. § 1235 
because he received the royalty payments in exchange for all 
substantial rights to the liquisolid felodipine formulation. 
